



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

OCPAS/CIG

CY# 285

25X1

25X1

## National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday  
19 October 1983*

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 83-245.IX

19 October 1983

Copy 285

25X1

**Page Denied**

Top Secret



25X1

Contents

USSR: Comments on INF ..... 1

NATO: Preparing for European Disarmament Conference .... 2


Philippines: Opposition Reaction to Reforms ..... 3

Iraq: Intelligence Chief Removed ..... 4

USSR-US: Effects of High-Technology Sanctions ..... 5

Bangladesh-US: General Ershad's Visit ..... 6

Lebanon: Site for Talks Unresolved ..... 7



25X1

USSR: Industrial Assistant for Andropov ..... 10

Norway-USSR: Prospects for Boundary Discussions ..... 11



25X1

Special Analysis

Angola: Political Stalemate in Luanda ..... 12



Top Secret



19 October 1983

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**USSR: Comments on INF**

*Recent Soviet statements suggest that the USSR intends to continue negotiating on INF at Geneva, at least until NATO deployments begin in December.* [redacted]

25X1

On 12 October—the day the Soviets had earlier hinted would be the deadline for progress—party spokesman Zamyatin indicated that the talks would continue until US missiles are deployed. The communique issued last Friday by the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers and the one released yesterday following Foreign Minister Gromyko's talks in East Germany support this position. Gromyko, [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the USSR has not yet decided what to do about the negotiations after the deployments have begun. [redacted]

25X1

Colonel General Chervov of the Soviet General Staff threatened in a recent interview given to a West German magazine that the USSR would respond by stationing its own missiles within 10 minutes' flight time of US territory, but he reportedly ruled out basing Soviet missiles in Cuba. He claimed that the USSR also would modernize its tactical nuclear missile units stationed with Soviet Army divisions in Eastern Europe and would deploy intermediate-range missiles in the western USSR. [redacted]

25X1

**Comment:** Moscow's apparent decision to remain at the INF talks presumably reflects a judgment that withdrawing would hurt its campaign to build public pressure on the West European governments not to proceed with INF deployment. The Soviets probably believe that they have to appear to be negotiating in good faith at least until the Bundestag debates on INF on 21 November. A walkout before this time, moreover, would undermine the propaganda impact of any last-minute initiatives the Soviets might be planning, such as an offer to go farther than their current proposal in reducing SS-20 deployments. [redacted]

25X1

Chervov's comments are only slightly more specific than previous threats to resume SS-20 deployments in the western USSR and to deploy new missiles aimed at Western Europe and US territory. They are consistent with the Soviets' effort to talk tough without appearing inflexible in Geneva. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

19 October 1983

**Top Secret**

25X1

**NATO: Preparing for European Disarmament Conference**

*NATO Ambassadors today will try to resolve Allied differences on tactics for the preparatory meeting of the European Disarmament Conference, which begins next Tuesday in Helsinki.* [redacted]

25X1

The three-week meeting in Helsinki will establish the agenda and procedures for the European Disarmament Conference. At the Conference itself, which is scheduled to begin on 17 January in Stockholm, the 35 participants are supposed to focus only on negotiations leading to the reduction of military tensions in Europe through the adoption of confidence and security building measures. The Allies, however, expect the USSR and some of the neutral states to use both meetings to push their own proposals on arms control issues. [redacted]

25X1

Despite these concerns, NATO members remain at odds on the number and length of sessions at Helsinki and on the creation of working groups. Most of the Allies, especially the French and West Germans, object to a US paper on public diplomacy tactics because it refers to seven confidence and security building measures proposed by the US as the basis for the Western position. In addition, the West Germans are causing problems by insisting that a paper outlining Allied policy for the Conference include references to limits on conventional forces. [redacted]

25X1

**Comment:** Most Allies will continue to develop their individual positions and to coordinate their views on the European Disarmament Conference within the framework of EC political cooperation. They are just beginning to address seriously the package of confidence and security building measures offered by the US as the basis of the Western negotiating position and are avoiding any commitments until they can analyze the US measures in depth. As a result, Allied negotiations on the package almost certainly will be protracted and contentious. [redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

19 October 1983

**Top Secret**

25X1

**PHILIPPINES: Opposition Reaction to Reforms**

*Opposition leaders are divided over the electoral reforms announced this week by President Marcos.* [REDACTED]

25X1

Marcos issued new rules for the National Assembly elections scheduled for next May. He changed the size of the electoral districts, eliminated bloc voting, and said he would appoint to the elections commission two members acceptable to the opposition. [REDACTED]

25X1

United Nationalist Democratic Organization leader Doy Laurel told a press conference yesterday that the conditions for opposition participation in the elections were "not yet acceptable," implying interest if more concessions are made. Leaders of the "Justice for Aquino, Justice for All" group, on the other hand, continue to demand that Marcos resign before the group will support the reforms. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Comment:** The move by Marcos follows several meetings with leaders of the business community about public disenchantment with his regime. The changes are a substantial shift for the President, who had been reluctant to offer genuine concessions on elections. [REDACTED]

25X1

The United Nationalist Democratic Organization, however, is still suspicious about Marcos's commitment to holding fair elections. It is anxious to extract maximum concessions and is waiting to see how the announced changes are carried out. Although the organization is satisfied with some of the reforms, it also would like a new voter registration list and more independent members on the elections commission. [REDACTED]

25X1

In addition, the group probably is concerned about losing ground to the Justice for Aquino alliance and other more militant groups by committing itself now to participating in an election that may prove fraudulent. The Justice for Aquino alliance is not a political party and cannot take part in elections, but it remains the driving force behind the campaign to get Marcos to resign. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**IRAQ: Intelligence Chief Removed**

*President Saddam Husayn's replacement of his half brother, Barzan, as head of the powerful intelligence service suggests that a serious rift has developed in the ruling clique.* [REDACTED]

25X1

Army commander General Fakhri has been appointed at least temporarily to replace Barzan, according to US diplomats in Baghdad. Another of Saddam's half brothers, Sab'awi, has left his position in the intelligence apparatus, and a third half brother, Watban, was either ousted or resigned as governor of Tikrit Province.

25X1

In the past few weeks there have been rumors in the capital of a split in the ruling Revolutionary Command Council. The US diplomats report that a majority of the Council recently confronted Saddam with the excesses of the intelligence services, including its takeover of many functions of the ruling Ba'th Party and the military. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Comment:** Saddam's hold on power depends on the loyalty of the intelligence service—the main internal security force—and on his leadership of the Ba'th Party and the Council. Now, however, his links to the intelligence service clearly have been weakened and his nearly total control of the Council has been called into question. [REDACTED]

25X1

The President probably will make a major effort to patch over the rift in the Tikriti clan. If the split continues, however, it will provide an opening for other Iraqis opposed to the Tikritis to maneuver for power. General Fakhri's appointment is another sign of the Army's growing power. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**USSR-US: Effects of High-Technology Sanctions**

*Tougher Western export controls are having a serious effect on computer research in the USSR and are of increasing concern to the Soviet military.* [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]  
[redacted] the effects of the US embargo on high-technology transfers following the invasion of Afghanistan were almost immediately felt by Soviet computer research scientists. Shortages of spare parts continue to plague Soviet scientists working with US and other Western computers. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

There also is growing concern in the military about the difficulties now encountered in acquiring Western technology. This has led to greater emphasis on the development of internal scientific resources and independent research. [redacted]

25X1

**Comment:** The push for greater self-reliance will not compensate for reduced access to Western technology. During the 1980s, the military will need many new Western components and the production technology to manufacture them. Tightened COCOM controls may force Moscow to stretch out certain weapon development programs in the 1990s or to seek alternative solutions. [redacted]

25X1

To overcome Western export controls, the Soviets probably will rely primarily on intensified collection efforts by their intelligence services. They also may increase attempts to cultivate alternative sources of supply, especially in neutral countries in Western Europe.

25X1

**Top Secret**

19 October 1983

25X1



**Top Secret**

25X1



**Chief Martial Law Administrator  
Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad**

Martial law leader since bloodless coup in March 1982 . . . age 53 . . . moderate, cautious, pragmatic . . . tries to maintain nonaligned but balanced foreign policy.

300999 10-83

25X1

**Top Secret**

19 October 1983

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**BANGLADESH-US: General Ershad's Visit**

*Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad is visiting Washington next week in an effort to strengthen his political position at home and to continue improving relations with the US, a major aid donor.*

25X1

The US Embassy reports that Ershad believes the scheduled meetings with the President and other senior US officials will strengthen his hand, particularly with his military constituency. He is trying to reinstitute civilian rule and become the country's next elected president by March 1985. He remains vulnerable to criticism from dissatisfied military elements and, to a lesser extent, from civilian politicians and student activists.

25X1

Ershad reportedly plans to emphasize his reforms to increase private sector activity and rural development. With more than 96 million people, Bangladesh is the world's eighth most populous nation and depends on international aid to keep its economy afloat. According to the Embassy, Ershad will seek to improve trade with the US and to encourage US private investment.

25X1

**Comment:** Ershad has good prospects for remaining in power over the next two years, because he is the least controversial of Bangladesh's senior military leaders. The defunct political parties are weak and are unlikely to organize an effective opposition movement. Ershad's civilian opponents in Dhaka nonetheless may try to mount demonstrations to embarrass him on the eve of his visit.

25X1

The Bangladesh leader probably will appeal only indirectly for an increase in US economic aid, while noting his country's moderate position on Third World issues. He also may try to elicit US support in bilateral problems with India, particularly the longstanding water-sharing dispute and the possible construction of a fence to reduce illegal migration along the Bangladesh-Indian border.

25X1

In addition, Ershad may cite his concern about a possible military threat from India and his own anti-Soviet outlook in seeking help to modernize Bangladesh's military establishment.

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**LEBANON: Site for Talks Unresolved**

Opposition leaders have refuted the government's claim that national reconciliation talks will begin tomorrow at Beirut airport and that the Multinational Force contingents will provide security for the participants. Druze leader Junblatt yesterday expressed fears for his personal safety if the talks were to take place there. The Druze and Syrians continue to oppose holding the talks in Lebanon. Foreign Minister Salem has told US officials that President Gemayel nonetheless believed he had no choice but to issue invitations to all parties to meet at the airport. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Comment:** Gemayel probably issued the invitations publicly in hopes of forcing opposition leaders to take part in the discussions. In the unlikely event that all parties agree to meet at the airport, US Marine positions there will be vulnerable to attack by disaffected groups that want to sabotage the talks. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**


25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

**Top Secret**

25X1



25X1

**USSR: Industrial Assistant for Andropov**

A Soviet newspaper early this month identified Arkjadiy Vol'skiy, who until recently was the first deputy chief of the party Central Committee's Machine Building Department, as one of General Secretary Andropov's assistants. Vol'skiy is an engineer who spent 14 years in one of the USSR's largest motor vehicle plants. In 1971 he won a prize for helping automate production. [redacted]

25X1


**Comment:** Vol'skiy's new assignment suggests that Andropov wants to oversee staffing in the industrial ministries, where several officials have been purged during the past year for incompetence or corruption. His background is unusual for a general secretary's assistant, but it provides expertise in an area where Andropov lacks either experience or acquaintances who are suitable for principal industrial positions. In the Central Committee, Vol'skiy probably kept track of machine-building industry administrators and helped arrange their promotions to the plant director or ministry level. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1**Top Secret**

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1



25X1

**Top Secret**

19 October 1983

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**NORWAY-USSR: Prospects for Boundary Discussions**

The Norwegian Ambassador in Moscow reports that the USSR has unexpectedly proposed that the two countries resume talks in November or early December on delimiting their maritime boundary in the Barents Sea. Talks were last held in December 1981, when the Soviets resisted any compromise on their claim to the meridian line as the boundary. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Comment:** Norway is likely to accept the invitation because of the economic benefits—particularly to its depressed northern region—of any agreement. Moscow wants Western help in exploiting the energy resources of the Barents Sea. The most promising petroleum areas lie in the disputed zone. The Norwegian oil industry and the Petroleum Ministry reportedly hope that the prospect of oil and the promise of technical assistance will help settle the dispute. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

## **Special Analysis**

---

### **ANGOLA: Political Stalemate in Luanda**

*Ideological and ethnic factionalism in the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has prevented the government from dealing with deteriorating economic and social conditions and from coming to terms with the US on the withdrawal of Cuban troops. President dos Santos still appears to lack the means to end the political deadlock in Luanda.*

25X1

*[redacted] there has been some restructuring and shifting of power as dos Santos has sought ways to cope with Angola's problems. In the meantime, the expanding UNITA insurgency has made the government more nervous. The security situation probably has caused Luanda to adopt a harder line in its talks with Washington.*

25X1

25X1

Dos Santos, a black, came to power four years ago as a compromise candidate—and he has ruled like one. The Soviet- and Cuban-backed hardliners in the Popular Movement backed him because they believed they would be able to control him. Although dos Santos has strengthened his position over the past year, the mulatto-led hardliners apparently still retain veto power over him.

25X1

The President's views on important issues have moved him closer to the other major faction, the black nationalists. Nonetheless, he does not appear to be strongly supported by this group.

25X1

For the past two years, dos Santos has removed extremists from both sides and replaced them with pragmatists. Although the central committee has given the President special powers, his ability to act with authority is undercut by the factional rivalries. Moreover, the protracted negotiations with Washington may have heightened the splits in the regime because the hardliners were generally excluded from the talks.

25X1

### **The Hardliners**

Party secretary Lucio Lara, a mulatto, continues to lead the hardliners. He is the Popular Movement's leading theoretician, a skillful political infighter, and a favorite of the Soviets.

25X1

Other key members of the hardline faction include Paulo Jorge, the mulatto Foreign Minister, and Ambrosio Lukoki, a leading black ideologue. Former Defense Minister Iko Carreira, another prominent

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1



**Top Secret**

25X1

mulatto, reportedly is close to Lara. Carreira evidently is serving as an adviser to the President on defense matters and is said to retain substantial support in the military. [redacted]

25X1

The faction looks to the massive Soviet and Cuban presence to sustain its dominant position and to protect it against a possible coup by black nationalists. As a result, hardliners oppose linking a withdrawal of Cuban troops to a settlement on Namibia. [redacted]

25X1

The hardliners also oppose rapprochement with insurgent leader Savimbi, who they believe is antimulatto. If Savimbi were removed, however, they probably would consider a reconciliation with UNITA. [redacted]

25X1

### **The Nationalists**

The black nationalists, the more militant of whom are sometimes referred to as the "Catete Group," have long resented the disproportionate influence wielded by the mulattoes. They are a larger but more loosely organized group than the hardliners, and they appear to have been seriously weakened by dos Santos's removal from the cabinet last year of Manuel Pacavira and, more recently, Mendes de Carvalho. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Minister of Foreign Trade Lopo do Nascimento has emerged as one of the most influential black leaders, although he is not generally regarded as a member of the Catete Group. Some [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] see him as a potential rival to dos Santos. Other blacks, such as Minister of Defense Pedro Maria Tonha, also have been mentioned as potential replacements for dos Santos. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

The black nationalists generally take moderate positions on important political and security questions. They reportedly favor a substantial reduction in the numbers of Soviets and Cubans in Angola, but in recent months they probably have become concerned that a rapid withdrawal of Communist support would help UNITA too much. The nationalists also are more inclined to talk to Savimbi and reduce support to SWAPO's insurgent campaign. [redacted]

25X1

### **Implications for the Negotiations on Namibia**

Dos Santos and other senior officials, in their recent [redacted] statements on southern African issues, are taking a tougher line. They insist that the Cuban issue will not be addressed until after a settlement on Namibia is implemented. They also demand that the South Africans leave Angolan territory and stop supporting Savimbi. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

Earlier this year dos Santos appeared considerably more flexible. In particular, he did not link progress toward a settlement on Namibia with UNITA issues. [REDACTED]

25X1

The substantial gains made by the insurgents since midsummer appear to be a primary factor in the hardening of Luanda's position. In addition, dos Santos's overtures to the US reportedly antagonized the Soviets and their Angolan supporters. The President may now believe that he needs to backtrack to ensure his political survival.

25X1

Despite Luanda's apparent intransigence, dos Santos probably will continue to pursue talks with the US. He is likely to believe that these efforts at least buy time for the regime. [REDACTED]

25X1

In addition, dos Santos may believe that the US might offer diplomatic recognition or economic aid, or that growing international pressure might force Washington and Pretoria to drop their insistence on linking a Cuban withdrawal to independence for Namibia. At a minimum, Luanda may believe that, as long as the talks continue, Pretoria will not increase its military pressure. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**Top Secret**